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DECONSTRUCTING THE MATERNAL WALL: STRATEGIES FOR
VINDICATING THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF “CARERS”1 IN THE WORKPLACE
JOAN C. WILLIAMS AND ELIZABETH S. WESTFALL*

I. INTRODUCTION
While the glass ceiling and sexual harassment continue to pose formidable
obstacles to women’s advancement in the workplace, many women are also
harmed by another form of gender discrimination known as the “maternal
2
wall.” Women run up against the maternal wall when they are discriminated
against in the workplace because of past, present or future pregnancies or
because they have taken one or more maternity leaves. Women also may
experience discrimination when they adopt part-time or flexible work schedules.
In recent years, women have increasingly sought legal relief to remedy
discrimination related to the maternal wall. In 1992, women filed 3,385 charges
3
of pregnancy discrimination, pursuant to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and state and
local Fair Employment Practices Agencies, and by 2004 that number had
4
increased by nearly forty percent to 4,512. In 1992, the total monetary benefits
recovered as a result of the filing of these charges, excluding monetary benefits
obtained through litigation, nearly tripled from $3.7 million in 1992 to $11.3
5
million in 2004.
Likewise, complaints filed with the U.S. Department of Labor concerning
6
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) are on the rise. Administrative
complaints to the U.S. Department of Labor increased by twenty percent in the

1. We adopt this term from Australia to refer to adults with family care-giving responsibilities.
See generally Juliet Bourke, Using the Law to Support Work/Life Issues: The Australian Experience, 12 AM.
U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 19 (2004).
* Elizabeth S. Westfall is a Senior Attorney with Advancement Project, Washington, D.C.; B.A.
Carleton College (1990); J.D. Harvard Law School (1996). Joan C. Williams is a Distinguished
Professor of Law and Founding Director of The Center for WorkLife Law, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law.
2. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers
Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77 (2003) [hereinafter Williams,
Beyond the Maternal Wall].
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
4. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION CHARGES
EEOC & FEPAS COMBINED: FY 1992-FY 2004, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/pregnanc.html (last
visited Nov. 5, 2005).
5. Id.
6. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub.L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).

31

03_WILLIAMS_WESTFALL.DOC

4/28/2006 8:54 AM

32 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

Volume 13:31

2006

7

past three years from 2,790 in 2001 to 3,350 in 2004. Of those complaints, the
majority involved employees who asserted that they were terminated after they
8
sought FMLA leave.
In addition to filing complaints with administrative agencies, women who
have experienced maternal wall discrimination are increasingly seeking to
vindicate their civil rights through litigation. One recent study of FMLA
litigation identified 140 written opinions issued between 1995 and 2003
9
concerning childbirth or adoption leave. Termination of employees after FMLA
leave was the primary reason that employees filed a complaint (32% of
complaints). Employer refusal to restore the employee to an equivalent position
after leave had ended produced the second highest number of complaints (23%
of complaints), followed closely by the denial of FMLA leave (22% of
complaints), and termination as the result of requesting leave (18% of
10
complaints).
With many cases being brought pursuant to the FMLA, as well as Title VII
11
12
of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) and the Equal Pay Act, a substantial body of
case law has developed in which plaintiffs have prevailed. These cases reveal
that, notwithstanding widespread criticisms of these civil rights laws, many
mothers—and others who have been discriminated against because of their caregiving responsibilities—are suing, and courts are often finding in their favor.
This article is the product of collaboration between a seasoned civil rights
litigator, Elizabeth Westfall, and the director of the Center for WorkLife Law at
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Joan Williams. WorkLife
Law is dedicated to decreasing the economic vulnerability of “carers” by
13
14
working with all sides—employers and employees,
plaintiffs’
and
15
16
17
management-side employment attorneys, as well as unions, and the press.

7. EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMIN., WAGE AND HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2004
STATISTICS FACT SHEET, http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/statistics/200411.htm (last visited Sept. 22,
2005).
8. See id.
9. Rafael Gely & Timothy D. Chandler, Maternity Leave Under the FMLA: An Analysis of the
Litigation Experience, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 143, 153-54 (2004).
10. Id. at 157-58.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (2000).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
13. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS & CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT, THE PROJECT FOR ATTORNEY
RETENTION, BETTER ON BALANCE? THE CORPORATE COUNSEL WORK/LIFE REPORT (2003), available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/WLL/betteronbalance.pdf; JOAN C. WILLIAMS & CYNTHIA
THOMAS CALVERT, THE PROJECT FOR ATTORNEY RETENTION, BALANCED HOURS: EFFECTIVE PART-TIME
POLICIES FOR WASHINGTON LAW FIRMS (2d ed. 2001), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/
site_files/WLL/BalancedHours2nd.pdf. For further information about The Project for Attorney
Retention, see http://www.pardc.org/.
14. See JOAN WILLIAMS & CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT, WORKLIFE LAW’S GUIDE TO FAMILY
CAREGIVER DISCRIMINATION (forthcoming).
15. WORKLIFE LAW, MITIGATING RISK: FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE LAW (forthcoming
2006).
16. See MARTIN H. MALIN, MAUREEN K. MILLIGAN, MARY C. STILL, & JOAN C. WILLIAMS,
WORKLIFE LAW, WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT, UNION STYLE: LABOR ARBITRATIONS INVOLVING FAMILY
CARE (2004), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/WLL/conflictunionstyle.pdf.
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This article examines some of the recent, groundbreaking case law from the
perspective of plaintiffs’ employment lawyers. Part II of this Article discusses
the impact of recent case law on the development of maternal wall
jurisprudence. Part III discusses where courts have narrowly construed the civil
rights statutes under which plaintiffs have brought their claims or imposed
other barriers to obtaining relief, and suggests strategies plaintiffs’ lawyers can
use to overcome these hurdles and redevelop the case law. Finally, Part IV
explores the potential of existing statutes to challenge the legality of specific
practices—such as the requirement that employees conduct all work in the office
and during particularized hours—that unfairly disadvantage many carers.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MATERNAL WALL CASE LAW AND THEIR POTENTIAL
TO BROADEN THE SCOPE OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS FOR CARERS
In the past several years, a number of significant decisions have enlarged
the class of plaintiffs protected by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and offered
victims of maternal wall discrimination greater latitude in proving their claims
under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Equal Pay Act. These cases are
also noteworthy because they are consistent with social science research in
recognizing that discrimination against mothers is often rooted in negative
stereotypes about pregnant women and mothers.
This Part discusses recent case law that increases the scope of the protected
class under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to include women who may
become pregnant in the future and establishes that under certain circumstances,
part-time workers may properly compare themselves to full-time workers. This
Part also discusses case law that makes clear that stereotyping about the
qualities of mothers constitutes gender discrimination and that cases brought
pursuant to this theory need not present comparative evidence of the
employer’s treatment of fathers. Finally, this Part analyzes the implications of
these cases for future litigation of maternal wall cases.
A. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act Prohibits Discrimination Based on Future
Pregnancies and the Potential to Become Pregnant.
Two federal appellate courts, the Sixth and Eighth Circuit Courts of
Appeals, recently held that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act applies to future
18
pregnancies, broadly defined. In Kocak v. Community Health Partners of Ohio,
17. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Envisioning a Career Path With Pit Stops, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, § 10,
at 1; Rebecca R. Kahlenberg, Dad-Friendly Benefits Must Be Nurtured; Corporate Culture, Not Official
Policy, Still Governs at Work, WASH. POST, June 12, 2005, at K01; Colleen O’Connor, Moms of the
World, Unite! A New Generation of Mothers is Seeking a Voice, DENVER POST, May 3, 2005, at F01; Joan
C. Williams & Ariane Hegewisch, Op-Ed, All Work and No Play Is the U.S. Way, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30,
2004, at B9; Emily Yellin, What Larry Summers Got Right; Many Women do Resist the 80-hour Workweek.
The Problem Is Men Who Don’t, TIME, Feb. 28, 2005, at 76.
18. Kocak v. Cmty. Health Partners of Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2005); Walsh v. Nat’l
Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2003); accord Newman v. Deer Path Inn, No. 98 C 7698,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19040, at *21 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 1999); Jolley v. Phillips Educ. Group of Cent.
Florida, Inc., Case No. 95-147-CIV-ORL-22, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19832, at *14 (M.D. Fla. July 3,
1996); Cleese v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 911 F. Supp. 1312, 1318 (D. Ore. 1995); Pacourek v. Inland Steel
Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1401-02 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
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Inc., Suzanne Kocak alleged that her former employer, Community Health
Partners of Ohio, had rejected her application for reemployment due to
19
complications in scheduling caused by her earlier pregnancy. The district court
held that Ms. Kocak was not protected by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
because she had not been pregnant nor had she had any medical conditions
related to pregnancy during her employer’s consideration of her application for
20
reemployment.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that this was an error, relying upon the
21
Supreme Court’s holding in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act prohibits an employer from
22
discriminating against a woman “because of her capacity to become pregnant.”
Additionally, the court clarified that if a plaintiff chooses to prove her case with
circumstantial evidence, she may satisfy the first prong of her prima facie case
by demonstrating that she “was pregnant at some point in time (and not
23
necessarily at the time of the adverse employment action complained of).”
Moreover, the court did not rule out that a woman who had never before been
pregnant could bring a claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act under the
theory that her employer discriminated against her because she could
24
potentially become pregnant in the future.
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Walsh v. National Computer Systems, Inc.,
rejected National Computer Systems’ argument that the judgment in favor of
Shirleen Walsh on her Title VII claim should be set aside because Ms. Walsh had
proceeded under a theory of parent or carer discrimination, which is not
25
covered by Title VII. Instead, it held that Ms. Walsh’s assertion that she was
discriminated against “not because she was a new parent, but because she is a
woman who had been pregnant, had taken a maternity leave, and might become
26
pregnant again,” was a viable claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit declined to disturb the jury verdict in favor of
Ms. Walsh’s Pregnancy Discrimination Act claim on the ground that Ms. Walsh
had presented evidence at trial that it was her “potential to become pregnant in
the future that served as a catalyst for [her supervisor’s] discriminatory
behavior”•including, among other evidence, testimony that when Ms. Walsh
had fainted at work, her supervisor remarked, “You better not be pregnant
27
again!”
1. Implications for Litigation of Maternal Wall Cases
Kocak and Walsh represent important precedent for victims of maternal wall
discrimination because they bring maternal wall discrimination within the

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Kocak, 400 F.3d at 468.
Id at 469.
499 U.S. 187 (1991).
Kocak, 400 F.3d at 469-70.
Id. at 470 n.2.
Id.
332 F.3d at 1160.
Id.
Id.
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purview of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. In so doing, these cases expand
the class of women protected by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, thereby
providing victims of maternal wall discrimination with an important avenue for
recovery.
The holding in Kocak and Walsh that women who experience discrimination
based on future pregnancies may avail themselves of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act aligns the coverage afforded by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act with the findings of social science research documenting
overwhelmingly negative stereotypes about the competence and commitment of
pregnant women and mothers. One study revealed that pregnant working
women are associated with several negative stereotypes—that they are “overly
emotional,” “irrational,” “moody,” “preoccupied,” “undependable,” and
28
“physically limited.”
Another study showed that pregnant women, as
compared to nonpregnant women, are subjected to lower performance ratings
29
based on identical behavior and other available information.
Such ratings
likely reflect the stereotypes that pregnant women will become less available
and committed to their jobs and that they pose risks to their employer because
30
they will likely not return to work at the conclusion of their maternity leave.
The stereotype that women who become pregnant will lose interest in their jobs,
if taken to its logical extreme, may cause employers to be reluctant to hire
women whom they fear might become pregnant. As one dissenting opinion put
it:
If an employer is allowed to take action based solely on the stereotype that new
mothers are unlikely to return to work, it requires only a small step for
companies to avoid hiring women of childbearing age altogether out of a fear
that the women will some day become pregnant, take a substantial amount of
31
time off, and perhaps never want to return to work at all.

Accordingly, Kocak and Walsh hold the potential to protect nonmothers as well
as mothers from maternal wall discrimination. These cases also substantially
enlarge the class of women who may bring claims pursuant to the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, since the class of women who may become pregnant in the
future is plainly larger than the class of women who are pregnant at a particular
moment in time. Kocak and Walsh broaden the class of women viewed as
“potentially pregnant” beyond the definition adopted in previous cases, notably
32
Johnson Controls, where the “potentially pregnant” plaintiffs were undergoing

28. See Jane A. Halpert et al., Pregnancy as a Source of Bias in Performance Appraisals, 14 J. ORG.
BEHAV. 649, 652-655 (1993).
29. Id. at 653-55.
30. See id. at 655; see also Venturelli v. ARC Cmty. Servs., 336 F.3d 606, 619 (7th Cir. 2003) (Evans,
J., dissenting) (When Appellee told ARC’s hiring employee that she wanted the job, he replied, “We
want to wait” because “we want to see how this pregnancy thing turns out. . . . I know how you
women are. Once you have that baby, you’re not going to want to return.”), vacated on other grounds,
350 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 2003).
31. Venturelli, 336 F.3d at 619.
32. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
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fertility treatments at the time of the adverse employment action or had
33
miscarried before such action was taken.
By contrast, Walsh endorsed plaintiff’s framing of her claim as
discrimination based on the fact that she was “a woman who had been
pregnant, had taken a maternity leave, and might become pregnant again,”
suggesting that plaintiffs need not prove a strong certainty of future pregnancy
34
to qualify for coverage under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Kocak goes a
step further by refraining from ruling on whether women who have never been
35
pregnant can sue under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. In so doing, Kocak
implies that any woman of childbearing age could meet the threshold inquiry in
a Pregnancy Discrimination Act case of whether the plaintiff is a member of the
36
protected class.
Walsh and Kocak also offer a new means of casting claims of plaintiffs who
believe that their employers discriminated against them on the basis of being
“new moms.” Courts have been uniformly unreceptive to “new mom” claims
37
brought under Title VII on the ground that “new moms” are not a protected
class under Title VII and that an individual’s choice to care for a child is a “social
38
role.” By permitting claims under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act based on
past, present or future pregnancies, Walsh and Kocak bring some discrimination
claims based on status as a “new mom” within the purview of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act.

33. See, e.g., Newman, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19040, at *21 (plaintiff terminated after miscarriage);
Cleese, 911 F. Supp. at 1315 (disparate treatment occurred while plaintiff was undergoing fertility
treatment); Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1401-02 (same).
34. 332 F.3d at 1160.
35. See 400 F.3d at 470 n.2.
36. These cases diminish the persuasiveness of cases in which courts have held that plaintiffs
must prove that they were pregnant at the time of or directly preceding the adverse employment
practice. See, e.g., Mullet v. Wayne-Dalton Corp., 338 F. Supp. 2d 806, 812-13 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (must
show plaintiff was pregnant as part of prima facie case); Bergman v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., 344 F.
Supp. 2d 998, 1001 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (same); Davis v. Emery Worldwide Corp., 267 F. Supp. 2d 109,
119 (D. Me. 2003) (same); Green v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 128, 135 (D. Me.
2002) (same); Weston-Smith v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 (D. Mass. 2001)
(same).
This line of cases directly contradicts the statutory language of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, which applies to “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), which Congress did not limit to current or past pregnancies.
37. E.g., Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 340-342 (8th Cir. 1997) (discrimination
claim based on status as new parent not cognizable under Pregnancy Discrimination Act); Piraino v.
Int’l Orientation Res., Inc., 84 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996) (claim brought by mother with young
children where the adverse action was not linked to her pregnancy would not be actionable under
Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
38. See Piantanida, 116 F.3d at 340, 342 (“[A]n employers’ discrimination against an employee
who has accepted this parental role . . . is . . . not based on the gender-specific biological functions of
pregnancy and child-bearing, but rather is based on a gender neutral status potentially possessible
by all employees, including men and women who will never be pregnant.”).
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B. Part-Time and Full-Time Employees May Be Similarly Situated Under the
Equal Pay Act and Title VII.
1. Case law
A district court in Virginia recently held that “the EPA [Equal Pay Act] . . .
does not categorically preclude a part-time plaintiff from establishing a prima
39
facie pay discrimination claim by designating a full-time comparator,” and
applied the same reasoning to companion claims brought under Title VII.
In Lovell v. BBNT Solutions, LLC, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia rejected defendant’s argument that Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
preclude comparisons of part-time and full-time workers. Linda Lovell, who
worked a reduced hour schedule of thirty hours per week, sought to compare
40
herself to an employee who worked a forty-hour work week.
The court
explained that, “where the plaintiff’s actual tasks, duties, and responsibilities are
essentially similar to those of the putative comparator,” the question whether a
part-time employee could be compared to a full-time employee was one of fact
41
for the jury to resolve. The court further opined that in determining whether
two employees are comparable for purposes of the Equal Pay Act, the jury
should focus on whether the full-time employee performs any additional tasks
42
or job duties, rather than focusing on the number of hours worked. Based on
this reasoning, the court also held that Ms. Lovell was not barred as a matter of
law from asserting that a full-time employee was similarly situated pursuant to
43
Title VII.
2. Implications for Litigation of Maternal Wall Cases
Lovell’s well-reasoned opinion expands the types of evidence that plaintiffs
with part-time schedules may use to litigate claims under Title VII and the Equal
Pay Act when their employers refuse to provide them with equitable
compensation, benefits, or opportunities for advancement. Lovell also exposes
the gender bias and faulty analysis that infect cases in which courts have held
that part-time and full-time employees can never be compared.
Several cases issued prior to Lovell, in which the courts rejected the
attempts of part-time employees to compare themselves with full-time
44
employees, reveal a bias against part-timers. For example, in Ilhardt v. Sara Lee

39. Lovell v. BBNT Solutions, LLC, 295 F. Supp. 2d 611, 621 (E.D. Va. 2003).
40. Id. at 619, 625.
41. Id. at 619.
42. Id. at 620-21. (“The key is therefore a difference in duties, not a difference in hours.”).
43. Id. at 624-25. (“Because the standard of similarity under Title VII is less stringent than the
standard under the EPA [Equal Pay Act], it necessarily follows that plaintiff also adduced sufficient
trial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff and [a full-time employee]
are similarly-situated employees under Title VII.”).
44. See, e.g., Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1155 (7th Cir. 1997); Stockhoff v. D.E.
Baugh Co., IP 01-0566-C-B/S, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3619, at *14 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2003) (full-time
and part-time employees not similarly situated); Payne v. Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist., 219 F.
Supp. 2d 273, 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (part-time, temporary employee must compare herself with other
part-time, temporary employees); Brown v. Super K-Mart, No. 98 C 3498, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9525,
at *13 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 1999) (full-time and part-time employees not similarly situated).
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Corp., the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that Lora Ilhardt,
who worked a part-time schedule, could not properly be compared to a
nonpregnant full-time employee on the ground that “full-time employees are
45
simply not similarly situated to part-time employees.”
In support of this
circular reasoning, the court made the equally circular assertion that “[t]here are
too many differences between them” such as the differences in hours worked
46
and the pay and benefits received by part-time employees. The argument that
it is legal to pay part-timers a lower wage rate than full-timers because of
“differences in pay” hardly seems a tour de force of legal reasoning. The court
did not explore whether the job responsibilities of Ms. Ilhardt and her full-time
peers were similar, nor did it cite any pertinent case law or statute in support of
47
its argument. Ilhardt’s circular reasoning smacks of what Michelle Travis has
termed “workplace essentialism,” that is, the assumption—without evidence—
that a job traditionally designed to require full-time work with very long hours
48
or unlimited overtime cannot be redesigned on a flexible schedule. Given the
49
extensive literature on job redesign and workplace flexibility, this seems an
indefensible assumption.
Moreover, unexamined assumptions that it is appropriate to deny parttimers advancement and to pay them a lower wage rate are troubling in the face
of social psychological studies documenting that part-time workers are
stereotyped as more similar to homemakers than to women employed full50
time; that homemakers are stereotyped as extraordinarily low in competence
51
(alongside the “elderly,” “blind,” “retarded,” and “disabled”); and that
stereotypes of women occur at the sub-group level (“homemakers,” “babes,”
52
“businesswomen,” etc.). This literature suggests the stigma associated with
53
part-time work tracks documented patterns of gender stereotyping.

45. 118 F.3d at 1155.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination Law,
62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 6-8 (2005) [hereinafter Travis, Recapturing Transformative Potential].
49. See LOTTE BAILYN, BREAKING THE MOLD 79-96 (1993); LOTTE BAILYN, ROBERT DRAGO &
THOMAS A. KOCHAN, INTEGRATING WORK AND FAMILY LIFE: A HOLISTIC APPROACH (2001); Lotte
Bailyn, Joyce K. Fletcher & Deborah Kolb, Unexpected Connections: Considering Employees’ Personal
Lives can Revitalize Your Business, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Summer 1997, at 11, 11-19.
50. Cf. Madeline E. Heilman, Sex Stereotypes and Their Effects in the Workplace: What We Know and
What We Don’t Know, 10 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY (SPECIAL ISSUE) 3, 10 (1995) (observing that
when a feature such as an individual’s sex is highlighted, distinctive or unique, it becomes salient
and thus the “basis of categorization and sex stereotypes”).
51. See Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth
Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 878
(2002); see also Thomas Eckes, Paternalistic and Envious Gender Stereotypes: Testing Predictions from the
Stereotype Content Model, 47 SEX ROLES 99, 110 (2002).
52. Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and Benevolent Sexism as
Complementary Justifications for Gender Inequality, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 109, 113 (2001).
53. Part-time workers are viewed as more similar to homemakers than to women employed full
time. See Alice H. Eagly & Valerie J. Steffen, Gender Stereotypes, Occupational Roles, and Beliefs About
Part-Time Employees, 10 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 252, 254 (1986). This phenomenon may explain why
part-time workers are stigmatized and denied opportunities for advancement. Williams, Beyond the
Maternal Wall, supra note 2, at 91.
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Holding that part-timers cannot use full-timers as comparators, regardless
54
of their “actual tasks, duties, and responsibilities,” significantly hampers, or
precludes altogether, many women’s ability to prove claims under Title VII or
the Equal Pay Act. For example, if a female plaintiff who works part-time brings
a Title VII or Equal Pay Act claim and seeks to prove her case circumstantially,
she would be required under Ilhardt to produce comparative evidence of
55
favorable treatment of male part-time workers.
In many (if not most)
56
workplaces, including the workplace in Ilhardt, no such comparators exist
because no males work part-time. As a result, a plaintiff would have extreme
difficulty proving her case with circumstantial evidence.
The result is to create enormous loopholes in the Equal Pay Act and Title
VII. As the court in Lovell observed, if part-time workers who brought Equal
Pay Act claims were prohibited as a matter of law from presenting comparative
evidence of treatment of full-time workers, “such a rule would allow an
employer to avoid the EPA’s [Equal Pay Act] strictures by simply employing
women in jobs with slightly reduced-hour schedules and paying them at a lower
rate than their male counterparts,” thereby “completely subvert[ing] the EPA’s
57
purpose.”
By focusing on the actual distinctions between full and part-time workers’
58
“tasks, duties, and responsibilities,” rather than on their schedules, Lovell
strikes a blow against workplace essentialism and expands opportunities for
part-time workers to litigate inequitable compensation, benefits and
opportunities for promotion under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.
C. Stereotyping of Women as Caregivers Can By Itself Be Evidence of Gender
Discrimination.
1. Case law
In Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free School District, the Second Circuit
held that stereotyping about the qualities of mothers is a form of gender
59
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. The court also held that a
plaintiff who brings this type of claim need not present evidence of how the
60
employer in question treated fathers.

54. Lovell, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 619, 625.
55. See Ilhardt, 118 F.3d.1151, 1155.
56. See id.
57. Lovell, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
58. Id. at 619, 625.
59. 365 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,
731-32 n.5 (2003) (stereotype that “women’s family duties trump those of the workplace” is a
“gender stereotype”); Plaetzer v. Borton Auto., Inc., No. Civ. 02-3089 JRT/JSM, 2004 WL 2066770, at
*6 n.3 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2004) (following Back; holding that “where an employer’s objection to an
employee’s parental duties is actually a veiled assertion that mothers, because they are women, are
insufficiently devoted to work, or that work and motherhood are incompatible, such treatment is
gender based and is properly addressed under Title VII.”).
60. Back, 365 F.3d at 113.
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Elana Back was a school psychologist at Hillside Elementary School who
61
received “excellent” evaluations during her first two years at the school. Ms.
Back presented evidence that shortly after her return from maternity leave, as
her tenure review was approaching, one of her supervisors, Ann Brennan,
inquired about how Ms. Back was “planning on spacing [her] offspring;” asked
that Ms. Back “not get pregnant until I retire;” and suggested that Ms. Back
62
“wait until [her son] was in kindergarten to have another child.”
Ms. Back also presented evidence that Ms. Brennan had repeatedly opined
63
that Ms. Back’s job was “not for a mother.” She and another of Ms. Back’s
supervisors, Marilyn Wishnie, expressed concern that because Ms. Back was a
64
“young mother, [she] would not continue [her] commitment to the workplace.”
Additionally, Ms. Brennan and Ms. Wishnie stated that they “wanted another
65
year to assess [Ms. Back’s] child care situation” before granting her tenure.
Notwithstanding this evidence, the district court granted Ms. Brennan and Ms.
66
Wishnie’s motions for summary judgment.
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that comments made about a
woman’s inability to combine work and motherhood—in particular, that a
woman cannot “be a good mother” and have a job that requires long hours or
that a mother who received tenure “would not show the same level of
commitment [she] had shown because [she] had little ones at home,” constituted
67
direct evidence of sex discrimination under a stereotyping theory. The court
further held that Ms. Back did not need to produce evidence about the school’s
treatment of male administrators with young children in order for her sex
68
discrimination claim to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
2. Implications for Litigation of Maternal Wall Cases
Back represents an extraordinary development in the area of maternal wall
jurisprudence. It forthrightly acknowledges that the belief of many employers
that mothers are insufficiently committed to their jobs and thus, cannot
69
competently perform their job responsibilities, is a pernicious stereotype. It
further holds that if a public employer takes adverse actions against a mother
based on such stereotypes, the employer will have engaged in intentional
70
gender discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Finally, Back
offers plaintiffs who bring discrimination cases under a stereotyping theory
flexibility in the evidence they must produce to defeat a defendant’s summary
71
judgment motion.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 114.
Id. at 115.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 113.
Id. at 119-20.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 124.
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First, the court recognizes that the Price Waterhouse stereotyping theory,
allowing “stereotyped remarks” to be “evidence that gender played a part” in an
72
adverse employment action, is available to plaintiffs who seek to support a
73
claim of sex discrimination with evidence of maternal wall bias.
This is
significant because stereotypes that mothers are not committed or competent are
74
remarkably prevalent in the workplace. Thus, statements evincing stereotypes
about the competence and commitment of mothers may be evidence that is
readily available to plaintiffs who assert that their employers have discriminated
against them on the basis of their sex.
Second, the particular stereotypes about mothers in the workplace that the
court identified have been documented by social scientists. The Back court
suggested that a jury could conclude that comments that: (1) mothers are not
committed to their jobs, cannot balance work and family life, or are less valuable
employees due to family responsibilities; (2) mothers are happier at home with
their children than performing market work; or (3) the family is the woman’s
domain, reflect gender-based stereotypes and that a jury could properly rely
75
upon such comments as evidence of unlawful gender animus. Social science
76
research has demonstrated that stereotypes about mothers are commonplace.
Third, Back offers plaintiffs who bring cases pursuant to a Price Waterhouse
stereotyping theory flexibility in proving intentional discrimination.
In
particular, Back suggests that plaintiffs need not present expert testimony to
support the assertion that certain comments reveal gender stereotyping. The
court held that the question of what constitutes a “gender-based stereotype” is a
question that “must be answered in the particular context in which it arises and
without undue formalization,” and that recognizing certain sex stereotypes
77
“takes no special training.” Thus, plaintiffs may avoid expending resources on
78
expert reports and testimony to explain such stereotypes.

72. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
73. Back, 365 F.3d at 119. In so holding, the Second Circuit expressly rejected the district court’s
holding that “gender plus” claims are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and held that the term
“sex plus” or “gender plus” is “simply a heuristic” and a “judicial convenience developed in the
context of Title VII to affirm that plaintiffs can, under certain circumstances, survive summary
judgment even when not all members of a disfavored class are discriminated against.” Id. at 118-19.
The court further explained that “[t]he relevant issue is not whether a claim is characterized as ‘sex
plus’ or ‘gender plus,’ but rather, whether the plaintiff provides evidence of purposefully sexdiscriminatory acts.” Id. at 119. Accordingly, plaintiffs whose employers took adverse actions
against them based on maternal wall stereotyping need not necessarily assert a “sex plus” claim of
gender discrimination. Rather, maternal wall stereotyping may properly support a claim of garden
variety sex discrimination.
74. One of the co-authors has observed that employers have “loose lips” when it comes to
overtly discriminatory comments about mothers in the workplace. Williams, Beyond the Maternal
Wall, supra note 2, at 108.
75. Back, 365 F.3d at 119-21.
76. See Williams, Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 2, at 90 (discussing social science research
as to stereotypes concerning mothers in the workplace).
77. Back, 365 F.3d at 119-20.
78. Although submission of an expert report to explain the link between a particular comment
and a gender-based stereotype may bolster a plaintiff’s legal claims, Back makes clear that such
submissions are unnecessary in the Second Circuit as to the particular stereotypes identified in that
decision. See Back, 365 F.3d at 120.
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Finally, Back makes clear that in proceeding under a Price Waterhouse
stereotyping theory, a plaintiff is not obligated to present comparative evidence
79
of similarly situated men. Therefore, if a plaintiff presents evidence that she
was subjected to stereotyping that was linked to her employer’s taking adverse
employment action against her, she need not present comparative evidence of
80
what her employer said about fathers. Nevertheless, as Back makes clear, such
81
evidence could only strengthen plaintiff’s claims.
III. DEVELOPING FAVORABLE CASE LAW WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES AN ADVERSE
ACTION AGAINST A PREGNANT EMPLOYEE DUE TO A TEMPORARY, PREGNANCYRELATED CONDITION
During the past fifteen years, a body of unfavorable case law has developed
in which courts have dismissed pregnancy discrimination cases in which the
employer took adverse action against the plaintiff because she was temporarily
unable to perform her job as a direct result of her pregnancy. For example,
courts have dismissed cases in which the plaintiff’s employment was terminated
82
due to her absence from work caused by morning sickness. Other courts have
dismissed claims brought by plaintiffs who became temporarily unable to lift
83
heavy objects due to their pregnancy.
The thrust of the courts’ reasoning in these cases is that the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act does not require employers to provide so-called
“preferential treatment” to pregnant employees. Under this reasoning, if an
employer has a policy that employees who are injured off the job are not entitled
to light or modified duty assignments, a pregnant employee who could no
longer perform heavy lifting, which was one of her job responsibilities, could be
denied a light duty assignment and terminated for her inability to lift heavy
79. Back, 365 F.3d at 121.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he
Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not protect a pregnant employee from being discharged for
being absent from work even if her absence is due to pregnancy or to complications of pregnancy,
unless the absences of nonpregnant employees are overlooked.”); Armindo v. Padlocker, Inc., 209
F.3d 1319, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The PDA [Pregnancy Discrimination Act] is not violated by an
employer who fires a pregnant employee for excessive absences, unless the employer overlooks the
comparable absences of non-pregnant employees.”); Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734,
738 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not . . . require employers to offer
maternity leave or take other steps to make it easier for pregnant women to work . . .”).
83. See, e.g., Spivey v. Beverly Enter., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The PDA
does not require that employers give preferential treatment to pregnant employees. Appellee was
therefore free to provide an accommodation to employees injured on the job without extending this
accommodation to pregnant employees.”) (citations omitted); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138
F.3d 204, 207 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he PDA does not impose an affirmative obligation on employers to
grant preferential treatment to pregnant women.”); Daugherty v. Genesis Health Ventures of
Salisbury, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 262, 265 (D. Md. 2004) (“[T]he rule seems to be that [pregnancy]
cannot be singled out for less favorable treatment.”); Mullet, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 811, 811 n.7 (although
“[e]mployers are not required to treat pregnant employees in any special way,” “an employer may
choose to give preferential treatment to pregnant employees, without giving the same preferential
treatment to other employees.”) (citing California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285
(1987)).
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objects, without violating the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Likewise, if an
employer had a policy of terminating employees for excessive absenteeism, a
pregnant employee whose morning sickness caused absences from work and
who was fired as a result would not have a claim under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act.
This Part discusses the reasoning behind the unfavorable case law
concerning absences from work or inability to engage in heavy lifting due to
pregnancy and proposes litigation strategies for redeveloping the case law to
increase the likelihood of favorable outcomes for plaintiffs. In particular, this
Part proposes legal strategies and discovery plans under which more favorable
case law might develop, including modifications to the McDonnell Douglas
84
burden-shifting framework, under which courts analyze most Pregnancy
Discrimination Act claims.
A. Unfavorable Pregnancy Discrimination Act Decisions Related to Pregnancy
Symptoms
Courts have set forth several bases for rejecting the claims of plaintiffs who
were terminated for pregnancy symptoms that resulted in absenteeism,
tardiness or inability to lift heavy objects. First, some courts have held that
when plaintiffs seek to prove their Pregnancy Discrimination Act claim within
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, their inability to perform the
required job functions, while concededly due to pregnancy, is fatal to proving a
85
prima facie case of discrimination. In these cases, the courts did not even reach
the issue of whether the employer’s conduct was a pretext for pregnancy
discrimination.
Second, courts have seized upon plaintiffs’ lack of comparative evidence
that the employer granted more favorable treatment to nonpregnant employees
86
who were tardy, absent from work, or unable to lift heavy objects. Courts have
emphasized the need for comparative evidence by referencing the statutory text
87
of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act which states, in part, that “women

84. The Supreme Court has explained that “McDonnell Douglas and subsequent decisions have
‘established an allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of proof
in . . . discriminatory-treatment cases.’ First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.” Then, the burden shifts to defendant to produce “evidence that the plaintiff was
rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.” If defendant
satisfies this burden, the plaintiff “must be afforded the ‘opportunity to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were
a pretext for discrimination.’” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43
(2000) (citations omitted).
85. See, e.g., Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1312 (requiring plaintiff to show, among other things, that “she
was qualified for the position or benefit sought” as part of her prima facie case); Urbana, 138 F.3d at
206 (same); Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736-37 (“[B]ecause of [Troupe’s] tardiness she could not show that she
met the employer’s requirements for her job, and thus she could not raise an issue of pretext.”);
Delcourt v. BL Dev. Corp., No. 2:97-CV-199-B-B, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18226, at *6 (N.D. Miss. Oct.
30, 1998) (requiring plaintiff to demonstrate that she was qualified for the job in question); Morazan
v. Stone, No. 3:94-CV-54-BR2, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 962, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 10, 1997) (same).
86. Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 583; Armindo, 209 F.3d at 1321; Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313; Troupe, 20 F.3d
at 736.
87. See, e.g., Armindo, 209 F.3d at 1320; Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1312.
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affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
88
their ability or inability to work.” Comparative evidence is necessary, courts
have often held, to assess whether pregnant plaintiffs were treated “the same”
as other workers.
Finally, courts have vigorously insisted that the Pregnancy Discrimination
89
Act does not require so-called “preferential treatment” of pregnant women and
have argued that the statute serves as a “shield against discrimination, not a
90
sword in the hands of a pregnant employee.” Even in cases in which the courts
have conceded that the actions at issue were taken because of plaintiff’s
pregnancy, they have dismissed their claims on the ground that pregnant
91
workers are not entitled to “preferential treatment.”
Remarkably, courts have affirmed the dismissal of Pregnancy
Discrimination Act claims, while at the same time admitting that plaintiffs were
terminated due to their pregnancy symptoms. For example, in Dormeyer v.
Comerica Bank-Illinois, the Seventh Circuit admitted that there was a relation
between plaintiff’s absenteeism and her pregnancy, “insofar as some of the
absences may have been due to morning sickness, which was, of course, a
92
consequence of [plaintiff’s] pregnancy.”
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in
Armindo v. Padlocker, Inc., acknowledged that “[a]t least some of these occasions
93
of [plaintiff’s] missed work were pregnancy related.”
While forthrightly acknowledging that the plaintiffs were fired due to their
pregnancies, the courts have held that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does
not prohibit all such seemingly discriminatory conduct. Far from ensuring that

88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). Cf. Venturelli, 336 F.3d at 618 (“When evaluating cases under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, we must determine whether an employer treated a pregnant
employee as it would have treated a ‘similarly affected but nonpregnant employee[].’ But
pregnancy is unique, often making that seemingly simple task a difficult one.”) (citation omitted).
89. Armindo, 209 F.3d at 1322; Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1312; Urbano, 138 F.3d at 208 (“Urbano’s claim
is thus not a request for relief from discrimination, but rather a demand for preferential
treatment . . . .”); Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738 (Pregnancy Discrimination Act is not a “warrant for
favoritism.”).
90. In re Carnegie Ctr. Assoc., 129 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 1997).
91. See, e.g., Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 583 (“[T]he [Pregnancy Discrimination Act] does not protect a
pregnant employee from being discharged for being absent from work even if her absence is due to
pregnancy or to complications of pregnancy, unless the absences of nonpregnant employees are
overlooked.”); Armindo, 209 F.3d at 1322 (same); Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313 (“[A]n employer does not
violate the PDA [Pregnancy Discrimination Act] when it offers modified duty solely to employees
who are injured on the job and not to employees who suffer from a non-occupational injury.”);
Urbano, 138 F.3d at 208 (“Continental treated Urbano the same as it treats any other worker who
suffered an injury off duty.”); Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738 (The Pregnancy Discrimination Act “requires the
employer to ignore an employee’s pregnancy, but . . . not her absence from work, unless the
employer overlooks the comparable absences of non-pregnant employees, in which event it would
not be ignoring pregnancy after all.”) (citations omitted).
92. Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 583. Likewise, in Armindo, the Eleventh Circuit framed one of the
issues before it as whether the employer as a matter of law violated the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act “to the extent that its decision to fire [plaintiff] was based upon absences and other missed work
that were the result of her pregnancy.” Armindo, 209 F.3d at 1321.
93. Armindo, 209 F.3d at 1321.
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pregnant women are not disadvantaged in the workplace due to their
pregnancy, the Seventh Circuit in Troupe v. May Department Stores Co.,
suggested that some degree of inequitable treatment between pregnant women
and their nonpregnant husbands is par for the course and not prohibited by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. The court specifically held that the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act does not “require employers to . . . make it easier for
pregnant women to work—to make it as easy, say as it is for their spouses to
94
continue working during pregnancy.”
In effect, Troupe and similar cases
remove significant categories of pregnant women—that is, those whose
pregnancies cause symptoms that interfere with their ability to perform their job
functions—from the scope of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. In so doing,
these cases preclude Pregnancy Discrimination Act protection for many women.
B. Strategies for Providing Legal Relief to Women Penalized at Work Because
of Pregnancy Symptoms
Pregnant women whose employers have subjected them to less favorable
terms and conditions, demoted them or terminated their employment on the
basis of their pregnancy symptoms, and who defend their actions by arguing
that they have subjected similarly situated nonpregnant employees to the same
treatment, may wish to adopt the following arguments and discovery plan in
support of their Pregnancy Discrimination Act claims.
First, plaintiffs should conduct discovery designed to identify direct
evidence of discriminatory intent, including but not limited to stereotypes
95
related to the plaintiff’s status as a pregnant woman or mother. As discussed
96
above, employers often make remarks that are based on stereotypes that
mothers are not sufficiently committed to or competent at performing their
97
jobs. Evidence of stereotyping may be sufficient, without additional proof, to
raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer acted with
98
discriminatory intent.
Second, if direct evidence is unavailable, plaintiffs who seek to prove their
cases circumstantially under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework,
should argue for a flexible, reasonable prima facie case that does not require the
plaintiff to demonstrate that she is currently able to perform all job functions. In
cases in which a plaintiff asserts that her employer discriminated against her by
terminating her employment while she was temporarily unable to perform one
or more of her job responsibilities due to pregnancy, some courts have required

94. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738 (citations omitted).
95. For a detailed discussion of the content of stereotyping against mothers and pregnant
women, see Williams, Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 2, at 90-101; see also Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 73132 n.5 (stereotype that “women’s family duties trump those of the workplace” is a “gender
stereotype”); Venturelli, 336 F.3d at 619 (discussing stereotype that pregnant women will be
unwilling to return to work after having a baby); Plaetzer, 2004 WL 2066770, at *6 n.3 (discussing
stereotype “that mothers, because they are women, are insufficiently devoted to work, or that work
and motherhood are incompatible.”).
96. See notes 28 through 31, supra, and accompanying text.
97. Back, 365 F.3d at 119-21.
98. Id. at 113.
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plaintiffs who seek to prove their case circumstantially to show in their prima
99
facie case that they were “qualified for the position that [they] lost.”
Imposition of this requirement results in narrowing the class protected by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, thereby removing from its scope pregnant
employees whose pregnancy symptoms temporarily prevent them from
performing one or more of their job functions.
100
A more appropriate inquiry, adopted by some courts, is whether the
plaintiff is qualified for the alternative job or modified job responsibilities that
she has requested, and whether she was qualified for the job that she had
previously held, and would again be so qualified once her pregnancy symptoms
had passed. This standard fulfills the purposes of both the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and the McDonnell Douglas test in winnowing out the most
obviously non-meritorious claims, while providing plaintiffs a fair opportunity
to prove their claims.
It is settled law that the standard for proving a prima facie case under
101
McDonnell Douglas is intended to be lenient. There is no convincing rationale
for imposing a more burdensome prima facie standard in pregnancy cases than
in other types of discrimination cases. Further, the courts have made clear that
the McDonnell Douglas test should not be applied in an inflexible, mechanical
102
manner. Yet with respect to plaintiffs who are temporarily unable to perform
their job responsibilities due to pregnancy, requiring such plaintiffs to prove
that they are able to perform all of their job responsibilities while pregnant
places a high proportion of pregnant women at risk of losing their jobs due to
the temporary physical burdens of pregnancy. In effect, this requirement
perpetuates the very discrimination the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was
103
designed to prohibit.
While granting plaintiffs more flexibility in proving a prima facie case, this
proposed standard also fulfills the purpose of the McDonnell Douglas framework
by identifying cases that plainly should be dismissed because the plaintiff was
incapable of performing her job, at least in part, for nonpregnancy related
reasons. For example, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that they were able to
perform their jobs absent pregnancy, would result in dismissal at the prima facie

99. E.g., Urbano, 138 F.3d at 206; Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1312.
100. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d
1184, 1192 (10th Cir. 2000) (requiring that plaintiff show that she qualified for the modified-duty
positions sought); Parker v. Albertson’s, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1245 (D. Utah 2004) (same).
101. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (proof of prima facie case is
not onerous); Pope v. ESA Servs., 406 F.3d 1001, 1008 (8th Cir. 2005) (same); Gillis v. Ga. Dep’t of
Corr., 400 F.3d 883, 889 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); Birch v. Cuyahoga County Probate Court, 392 F.3d
151, 167 (6th Cir. 2004) (same).
102. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (“[P]recise requirements of a prima
facie case can vary depending on the context and were ‘never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or
ritualistic.’”) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)); Birch, 392 F.3d at
165-66 (same); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1123 n.17 (9th Cir. 2004) (same).
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (unlawful to discriminate in employment “because of or on the basis
of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions”); Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 763
(7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that “[a]n unlawful employment practice occurs whenever pregnancy is a
motivating factor for an adverse employment decision”).
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stage of cases such as Armindo, in which the plaintiff’s absences from work were
104
both pregnancy and nonpregnancy related.
The proposed standard also furthers the purpose of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act by allowing the plaintiff to present evidence that the
employer’s purported nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action is a
pretext for discrimination. “At the prima facie stage . . . a plaintiff is only
required to raise an inference of discrimination, not dispel the non105
discriminatory reasons subsequently proffered by the defendant.”
If a
plaintiff’s claim is dismissed at the prima facie stage because she cannot
demonstrate that she is able to perform all of her job functions, cases in which
employers have acted with discriminatory intent in establishing policies that
target pregnant women for adverse treatment would not be actionable under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act—contrary to the very purpose of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act.
Suppose, for example, upon receiving notice of an employee’s pregnancy,
an employer adopts a policy of limiting assignments of light duty jobs to
employees who are injured on the job. Certainly the timing of such a policy
change would be strong circumstantial evidence of discrimination against
106
pregnant women. Nevertheless, under the prima facie test currently employed
by some courts, a pregnant plaintiff who was physically unable to perform
heavy lifting would be precluded from bringing a Pregnancy Discrimination Act
claim, even if her employer had acted with discriminatory intent on the basis of
plaintiffs’ pregnancy in establishing its light duty policy.
Third, plaintiffs should thoroughly explore the employer’s treatment of
nonpregnant employees whom the employer purports are similarly situated to
the plaintiff. In several Pregnancy Discrimination Act cases in which the court
affirmed dismissal of plaintiff’s claims, the plaintiff had not presented
107
comparative evidence of the employer’s treatment of nonpregnant employees.
If the plaintiff is unable to unearth differential application of the employer’s
policy to pregnant and nonpregnant employees, the plaintiff should gather
evidence that shows that the pregnant and nonpregnant employees whom the
108
employer asserts it treated equally are not similarly situated. For example, if

104. Armindo, 209 F.3d at 1321.
105. See Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d at 1193.
106. See Wills-Hingos v. Raymond Corp., 104 F. App’x 773, 775 (2d Cir. 2004) (evidence that
employee had unblemished record and was terminated after the defendant learned of her pregnancy
and that her termination occurred immediately after she returned to work after a brief absence due
to pregnancy-related conditions supported verdict in employee’s favor); Canavan v. Rita Ann
Distrib., No. Civ. CCB03-3466, 2005 WL 67077, at *5 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2005) (“Temporal proximity
between a protected activity and an adverse employment action may support an inference of
discrimination.”); Newman, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19040, at *19 (“A sudden change in attitude upon
disclosure that the plaintiff is pregnant and/or is taking maternity leave may raise an inference of
discrimination if the plaintiff can establish that the only intervening event was the disclosure.”).
107. See Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 583; Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313; Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736 (“We do not
know whether Lord & Taylor was less tolerant of Troupe’s tardiness than it would have been had
the cause not been a medical condition related to pregnancy. There is no evidence on this question,
vital as it is.”).
108. Although it would appear that the condition of pregnancy itself should render nonpregnant
employees who are temporarily unable to perform a job function and pregnant workers suffering
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the employer argues that it fired both pregnant and nonpregnant workers for
tardiness, the plaintiff should attempt to discover differences between the
plaintiff and persons outside of the protected class, such as frequency or severity
of the tardiness, performance problems of the nonpregnant employees that
might explain their terminations, and differences in the job responsibilities of the
nonpregnant employees that might make their physical presence in the office
during fixed hours, but not the plaintiff’s, crucial to the firm’s operations.
Finally, plaintiffs whose pregnancy symptoms render them temporarily
unable to perform one or more of their job functions and who cannot produce
comparative evidence that their employers treated nonpregnant employees
more favorably, or distinguish those comparators, should argue that they are
entitled to present other circumstantial evidence that their employer
discriminated against them on the basis of their pregnancy or “related medical
109
conditions.”
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s first clause prohibits sex
discrimination in employment “because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions . . . . ,” and its second clause requires
that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt
of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but
110
similar in their ability or inability to work.”
Because the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act’s second clause (the requirement that women be treated the
111
same) does not limit the first clause (the basic antidiscrimination provision),
even if a plaintiff who is unable to show that her employer has violated the
requirement that women be treated “the same,” should be permitted to present
evidence that her employer has violated the basic antidiscrimination provision.
Plaintiffs whose employers assert that they have complied with the
requirement that women be treated “the same” should seek discovery of
circumstantial evidence that their employers’ actions against them were
motivated by discriminatory intent on the basis of their pregnancy. For
example, suppose the plaintiff is a lawyer whose employer ostensibly
terminated her due to her tardiness that stemmed entirely from morning
from the same dissimilarly situated, most courts have not seen it that way. A notable exception is
the dissenting opinion in In re Carnegie Ctr. Assoc., in which Judge McKee observed, “One can not
avoid a claim of discrimination by treating persons who are not similarly situated the same . . . The
majority’s reasoning would allow an employer to terminate a female employee because she missed a
crucial meeting with an important client if a male employee would be terminated, even if the female
missed the meeting because she was in labor delivering a baby, or suffering from a pregnancyrelated condition. Although it may not be fair to terminate the male, it would not be illegal. It is
illegal to terminate the female because of the PDA [Pregnancy Discrimination Act].” 129 F.3d at 303.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
110. Id.
111. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 479 U.S. at 285; Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 462 U.S. 669, 678 n.14 (1983) (“The meaning
of the first clause is not limited by the specific language in the second clause, which explains the
application of the general principle to women employees.”); Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 577
(5th Cir. 2003); Aubrey v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 886 F.2d 119, 123 (6th Cir. 1989); Mullet, 338 F. Supp. 2d
at 812 n.7 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 937-40 (1985) (the second clause “supplements, without
limiting, the statutory definition of ‘sex’ set forth in the PDA’s [Pregnancy Discrimination Act] first
clause”).
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sickness, and the employer defends its decision by asserting that it has a policy
of terminating employees, nonpregnant and pregnant alike, for tardiness. If the
plaintiff is unable to discover direct evidence of discrimination, evidence of
stereotyping, or evidence that the nonpregnant employees whom the employer
argues it treated the same as plaintiff are distinguishable, the plaintiff should
probe the genesis of the employer’s policy to determine whether the morning
sickness-related tardiness of the plaintiff or another pregnant employee
112
triggered the adoption of the policy; whether the alleged purpose of the policy
113
is otherwise pretextual; what the history of the use of such policy is and to
whom it has been applied; the job performance of all employees whom the
employer asserts it terminated for absenteeism (that is, were the employees
actually terminated for infractions other than absenteeism); the employer’s
treatment of other pregnant employees; the representation of pregnant women,
114
and women generally, in the employer’s workforce; and the employer’s
policies with regard to pregnancy, maternity leave and work/life balance.
The plaintiff should also seek to show that firing her for absenteeism was
merely a pretext for pregnancy discrimination because the absenteeism did not
hamper her ability to perform her job responsibilities. She might show, for
example, that given her ability to satisfy her billable hour requirements while
working at home, her presence in the office was not a necessary component of
her job. Although some courts assume, without support, that presence in the
office is necessary and that termination of absent employees is fully warranted
115
and not actionable under Title VII, plaintiffs may be able to show that their
presence in the office during particular hours was not in fact necessary to
performance of their jobs. Evidence that the plaintiff’s presence in the office was
not necessary would represent circumstantial evidence of the employer’s
116
discriminatory intent in firing her.
Thus, by presenting circumstantial evidence that the employer fired the
plaintiff not because of her absenteeism, but because of her pregnancy, a
“related medical condition” or because of employer-held stereotypes about

112. See Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d at 1195 n.7 (“An employer could adopt a
policy . . . as a method of ensuring that it would be able to terminate pregnant women with work
restrictions while, at the same time, ensuring that it could retain other temporarily-disabled
employees.”).
113. See id. at 1197-98 (evidence that employer’s purported reason for the policy―reduction of its
workers’ compensation costs―was unsupported by studies that showed, in part, that it was
pretextual).
114. See Sigmon v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 901 F. Supp. 667, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (in
pregnancy discrimination case, reasonable fact finder could infer that unlawful discrimination
caused decreasing number of women in corporate department).
115. See Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 583 (assuming that physical presence in the office is always a
necessary requirement of a job); Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738-39 (same); Rafeh v. Univ. Research Co., 114 F.
Supp. 2d 396, 399 (D. Md. 2000) (“As a matter of law an employer may mandate that those in
leadership positions come to the office to do their job. On its face [this] is an entirely reasonable
requirement and one dictated by principles of sound management.”).
116. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 (“Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence
is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it
may be quite persuasive.”).
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pregnant women, the plaintiff may be able to persuade a court to deny the
employer’s summary judgment motion.
IV. DISPARATE TREATMENT LITIGATION TO CHALLENGE PRACTICES THAT UNFAIRLY
DISADVANTAGE CAREGIVERS
Numerous commentators have argued that Title VII has little to offer in the
117
way of restructuring the workplace or establishing new workplace norms.
These criticisms suggest that legislative reform, collective bargaining, public
education, and collaboration with employers may be more fruitful in changing
workplace norms than litigation under Title VII. While these strategies may be
productive and should be pursued, this Part argues that Title VII is not without
potential to remove barriers to caretakers’ participation in the workforce and
proposes litigation strategies designed to challenge the legality of widespread
practices in the workplace—such as requirements that employees work fixed
hours and conduct all work in the office—that unfairly disadvantage carers.
In her recent article, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment
Discrimination Law, Michelle Travis proposes revitalizing the use of disparate
impact claims under Title VII to remove structural barriers faced by women
with care-giving responsibilities and to deconstruct workplace norms that
unfairly favor “ideal workers” who are able to provide a full-time uninterrupted
118
stream of market work.
Travis suggests that Title VII has “unrealized
transformative potential” which could be used to distinguish “actual job tasks
119
from malleable organizational norms” subject to disparate impact review.
Although the legislative history of Title VII and a handful of cases that Travis
120
cites support this thesis, the dearth of pertinent case law and difficulty in
121
proving that a given practice has a disparate impact on pregnant employees
suggest that the plaintiffs’ bar may be reluctant to consider adopting Travis’s
strategy and bringing the types of litigation that Travis proposes.
This Part proposes alternative ways in which litigants may creatively use
disparate treatment claims under Title VII to bring about structural change in
the workplace and identifies specific workplace settings and practices that
would present situations ripe for legal challenge. At first blush, disparate
treatment claims do not appear to hold much promise for attacking workplace
norms that favor ideal workers who do not have significant caretaking
responsibilities.
At their core, disparate treatment claims focus on an

117. See Travis, Recapturing Transformative Potential, supra note 48, at 7 n.15 (listing
commentators).
118. See generally id.; JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2, 24, 71 (2000).
119. Travis, Recapturing Transformative Potential, supra note 48, at 77.
120. See id. at 79-82 (citing five cases).
121. See, e.g., Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1314 (“Establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination involves two steps. First, the plaintiff must identify the specific employment practice
that allegedly has a disproportionate impact. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate causation by
offering statistical evidence sufficient to show that the challenged practice has resulted in prohibited
discrimination. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer can then respond with
evidence that the challenged practice is both related to the position in question and consistent with
business necessity.”) (citations omitted).
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employer’s treatment of an individual employee, not workplace policies or
norms.
Nevertheless, where a plaintiff seeks to prove her case with
circumstantial evidence, the concept of pretext in the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting paradigm—long familiar to courts and the employment bar—may
provide a means for challenging workplace structures that unfairly
disadvantage carers.
Under the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff must
show that the employer’s purported legitimate reason for its adverse action
122
against the plaintiff is a pretext for discrimination.
As the Supreme Court
recently explained, “[t]he trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the
explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory
123
124
purpose.”
Evidence in support of pretext may “take a variety of forms,”
including facts that reveal “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons
for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of
125
credence.”
As a result, plaintiffs are permitted broad leeway in conducting
126
discovery to prove pretext.
Proving that an employer’s purported nondiscriminatory reason for an
adverse employment action is pretextual provides the plaintiff with an
opportunity to expose the employer’s policy as false and illegitimate as applied
to her and, by extension, other workers. As discussed in Part IV, supra, many
disparate treatment cases brought under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
hinge upon the employer’s assertion that it has a policy of terminating all
employees, pregnant or not, for absenteeism or tardiness. If the plaintiff’s job
does not require her physical presence in the workplace (at all, or during
127
particular hours), the plaintiff could seek to prove pretext by presenting
evidence that the employer’s argument that she needed to be present in the

122. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
123. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147.
124. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978).
125. Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d 1092, 1102 (10th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); see Abramson v.
William Paterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 283 (3d Cir. 2001); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless
Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir. 2000).
126. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. demonstrates the use of broad discovery concerning pretext
and its potential to bring about favorable outcomes for plaintiffs who bring Pregnancy
Discrimination Act claims. In that case, the EEOC skillfully gathered evidence that exposed the
irrationality of employer’s asserted rule that it denied modified-duty assignments to pregnant
women because their temporary disabilities did not stem from on-the-job injuries. Horizon/CMS
Healthcare Corp, 220 F.3d at 1197. The employer had argued that the purpose of this policy was to
reduce workers’ compensation costs. Id. In demonstrating that the employer’s reason for
terminating the pregnant employees was pretextual, the EEOC set forth evidence that the employer
had never conducted a formalized study of the cost savings purportedly associated with
maintaining its policy; the employer was unable to articulate the economic factors justifying the
policy or to explain how the policy reduced workers’ compensation costs; and there was no shortage
of modified duty positions available. Id. at 1198. This evidence, among other facts, led the Tenth
Circuit to conclude that there was a genuine doubt about the employer’s motivation for making a
distinction in the modified duty policy between employees injured on the job and those injured off
the job. Id. at 1200.
127. Many accounting, attorney, sales, management, and consulting jobs could fall into this
category.
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workplace during certain hours, was merely a pretext for unlawful
discrimination.
For example, in defending their decision to terminate the employment of a
pregnant worker, some employers assert that they merely applied a reasonable
workplace rule, such as terminating the employment of workers who are absent
or tardy, to the plaintiff and that because they apply the rule to all employees,
the decision to terminate the plaintiff could not have been infected with
discriminatory animus. Ideally, the employer will have mechanically applied its
rule to the plaintiff without regard to her actual job responsibilities.
Through discovery, the plaintiff could then explore (1) the
inappropriateness of applying the rule to her job; (2) her ability to fulfill her job
requirements without being physically present in the office; and (3) the impact
of the rule on carers. Such discovery would enable the plaintiff both to prove
that the employer’s reason for firing her was pretextual, and to challenge the
assumption of many courts and employers that all employees, regardless of
their particular job responsibilities, must conduct their work in the office during
particularized and unvarying business hours and that this requirement is a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory requirement.
In so doing, the plaintiff would show the court that such rules are not
necessary in successfully carrying out many jobs and that those employers who
unfairly apply them to pregnant women who can successfully work from home
or work different hours, will not be shielded from liability under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act. This approach, if successful, could cause employers to
review their absenteeism and tardiness policies to ensure that their application
to pregnant employees would withstand an attack for being a pretext for
discrimination. Accordingly, these cases might undermine the workplace
essentialism that disadvantages many carers.
V. CONCLUSION
In increasing numbers, mothers who are subjected to maternal wall
discrimination are seeking to vindicate their civil rights in the courts and
administrative agencies. Where employers have engaged in stereotyping of
mothers, subjected part-time and full-time workers to differential terms or
conditions, or taken adverse actions against women based on past, present or
future pregnancies, the victims of such conduct may now cite favorable case law
in support of their claims under Title VII or the Equal Pay Act.
Additionally, pregnant women whose employers take adverse action
against them based on pregnancy symptoms that have rendered them
temporarily unable to perform one or more of their job functions should not be
foreclosed from seeking remedies under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
Notwithstanding some courts’ obsession with comparing such employees to
nonpregnant employees who are purportedly similarly situated, plaintiffs are
not prevented from presenting evidence of stereotyping or circumstantial
evidence that does not focus on comparators to prove their claims. Finally, in
seeking to challenge workplace norms that favor ideal workers, plaintiffs and
their counsel should not overlook Title VII’s disparate treatment theory under
which proof of pretext may be employed to show, quite persuasively, that
certain workplace norms are not essential parts of a particular job.

03_WILLIAMS_WESTFALL.DOC

4/28/2006 8:54 AM

DECONSTRUCTING THE MATERNAL WALL

53

At this juncture, discrimination against carers is often transparent, as
employers are surprisingly open in expressing stereotypes about mothers prior
to taking adverse action against them. Because mothers and others carers have
begun to challenge this form of gender discrimination in increasing numbers,
often successfully, employers have a significant incentive to eliminate
discrimination against adults with family responsibilities.

